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ConfuCius and the effortless  
life of Virtue
Hagop Sarkissian
Life is complex. Human beings typically require years of guidance, rearing, and correction by others in order to navigate the social 
world with any degree of proficiency, and even with considerable experi-
ence it remains likely that one will encounter awkward situations, face 
conflicting social or moral demands, or be unsure of what how to act 
or what to feel. Hence, while it may seem attractive to live a life full of 
spontaneity and natural ease, the facts of social life seem to preclude 
this possibility.
 The wonderfully terse biography of Confucius in Analects 2:4 sug-
gests otherwise.1 After a prolonged period of learning and cultivation, 
Confucius achieved a state of advanced virtuosity, allowing him to assent 
to his emotional prompts without hesitation and without encountering 
friction or resistance by others:
The Master said:
At fifteen I set my heart on learning;
At thirty I took my position [in society]
At forty I had no doubts
At fifty I understood the commands of Heaven
At sixty my ears were attuned
At seventy I could follow my heart’s desires without transgressing  
 norms.2
Confucius, by all accounts, was not a recluse. Hence, the passage implies 
that (a) Confucius set his mind on a course of study or cultivation at 
the age of fifteen, (b) pursued such studies for a span of fifty-five years, 
and (c) was thereby able to cultivate a state of being such that he could 
follow his immediate inclinations in all of life’s predicaments without 
transgressing social norms.
 Trusting, for now, that this is not a vacuous boast, and assuming the 
ideal of living naturally worth emulating, we shall examine the Analects 
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to see if it contains any plausible program of learning that would allow 
one eventually to act according to inclination without transgressing 
norms. When viewed in the context of recent developments in moral 
psychology, Confucius’s emphasis on emotional education seems the 
most promising source for attaining such an ideal (though ultimately 
it remains just that—an ideal).
i. tHe limits of ProPriety
The best place to start is with li ( ) or ritual propriety, Confucius’s 
greatest preoccupation and the foundation of his virtue curriculum. of 
course, Confucius was not solely occupied with li. His curriculum also 
included the study of music, poetry, archery, and history, all considered 
important to cultivating virtue; but owing to restrictions in space, we 
shall concentrate on propriety. Not only does it feature prominently in 
the Analects, but observing ritual propriety is distinguished from the 
other disciplines insofar as it emphasized (among other things) social 
intercourse. Social exchanges were considered imperative to the cultiva-
tion of virtue, for Confucius believed virtuous conduct requires not only 
proper emotions and character but also something akin to “mind-reading” 
(discussed in section IV, below).
 The li comprised religious rites (ancestor worship) and formal cere-
monies (weddings, funerals), as well as the manners and customs, the 
strictures and prerogatives, the protocols and functions of each social, 
political and familial station. The li would indicate, for example, appro-
priate dress for ceremonial occasions, as well as appropriate conduct 
for a father or a son. Strict compliance with such conventional rules of 
propriety was, however, inadequate for a virtuous life. In fact, stringent 
attention to rules of propriety could be offensive (3:18). Confucius rec-
ognized a wide gap between observing propriety and acting virtuously, 
the latter requiring, in addition to formal compliance, the following 
qualifiers:
(a) The individual must observe propriety with appropriate dis-
positional attitudes; there must be an emotional “presence” (3:12, 
3:26). emotional authenticity trumps procedural formality (3:4, 
17:11).
(b) Propriety must be observed effortlessly, naturally, and spon-
taneously; the virtuous exemplar will not appear “troubled” (9:28, 
14:30).3
(c) finally, there is the matter of matching propriety to occasion, 
for which there is no algorithm. Knowing when to observe propri-
ety—and when not to—was requisite to the exercise of virtue.
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familiarity with the rules of propriety was an important start, but only 
that; for the social world is neither straightforward nor routine, and 
much human intercourse falls outside the immediate scope of propriety. 
Worse still, the demands of propriety may conflict in certain situations, 
and figuring out whether some ritual is more appropriate or whether it 
requires modification or when no ritual fits at all requires skill. In sum, 
the infinitely complex configurations of the social world require highly 
particularized responses, leaving mastery of ritual propriety inadequate 
to constitute (by itself) the whole of virtue.
rituals and emotions
for Confucius, observing ritual propriety was clearly something more 
than mimicking gestures and following rules. The point of observing 
ritual propriety was rather to discipline oneself (for example, 6:27, 12:15) 
and thereby cultivate or shape virtuous emotions such as love, reverence, 
humility, gratitude, faith, and loyalty. In the absence of ritualized hu-
man interaction, Confucius believed basic emotions might compromise 
social harmony (for example, 8:2). Then again, assiduous practice risked 
overrunning the nascent propensities of the heart-and-mind. “When 
substance (zhi ) surpasses refinement, you have a boor. When refine-
ment surpasses substance, you have a pedant. When substance and 
refinement are proportional, you have an exemplary person (6:18).” The 
aim, then, was to strike a balance.
 This causal relationship between observing propriety and shaping 
emotion is patent and widely acknowledged.4 Thus, Confucius’s preoccu-
pation with observing ritual propriety points to a parallel preoccupation 
with emotions. Why such emphasis on emotions?
The Proper and the Appropriate
Virtuous exemplars are characterized by Confucius as those who “in 
making their way in the world are neither bent on nor against any-
thing; rather, they go with what is appropriate (yi )” (4:10). Yi, then, 
denotes appropriate behavior “in the vast sea of unique life situations 
where more often than not there is no simple ‘covering’ rule of li.”5 In 
this context, yi means something like (a) embodying the spirit of propri-
ety, (b) conforming to one’s unique position in society, and (c) conducive 
to social harmony.6 for example, the li of filial piety normally requires 
a son to maintain a reverential and deferential attitude toward his 
father; however, he may also dissent if his father deviates from proper 
conduct. When is it appropriate to dissent? In what manner? Should 
the son inform other family members or keep the matter to himself? 
These crucial questions admit of no easy answers, and yet the absence 
of prescribed rules of propriety does not excuse the agent from virtuous 
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conduct; rather, the agent must somehow act in the “spirit” of propriety, 
even if this entails acting contrary to propriety.7 The agent must have 
some means to determine appropriate action.
 one possibility is the use of some form of practical reasoning. Indeed, 
there are places in the Analects where Confucius advocates the use of 
analogical reasoning, as exemplified in the “negative golden rule” (for 
example, 12:2) and the virtue of reciprocity (shu ).8 Nevertheless, this 
paper is limited to explicating and evaluating the spontaneity of “Confu-
cius at seventy,” which includes a temporal aspect anathema to prolonged 
reasoning or contemplation. Tu Wei-Ming, for example, describes yi as 
“a practical judgment based upon the holistic evaluation of objective 
conditions.”9 How long would it take to produce such a judgment? Is it 
even possible to “holistically evaluate objective conditions”? Time is a 
luxury often unavailable to the virtuous agent; in some situations, any 
thought would be one-thought-too-many.10 Moreover, Confucius explicitly 
refers to the desires of the heart-and-mind, which seems opposed to 
the notion of practical reasoning. finally, the very progression of the 
biographical sketch suggests that, at the end of his lengthy period of 
self-cultivation, he had achieved such skill as to preclude the need for 
deliberation of this sort.
 In the absence of reasoning—and under pressures of time—how 
does the virtuous agent act appropriately? Various answers have been 
proposed to this question, all of them indicative of an intuitive faculty. 
for example, Joel Kupperman believes Confucius requires the virtuous 
agent to “gravitate” to the appropriate action; “what he ‘feels like’ do-
ing is what is right.”11 Philip Ivanhoe calls it an “intuitive sense of the 
Way” (Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation, 1). It is precisely this 
intuitive ability that enables the virtuous spontaneity of the mature 
Confucius, yet how can we account for it?
 There are no explicit answers in the Analects, but Confucius’s empha-
sis on emotional education suggests a possible answer. Indeed, recent 
developments in the philosophy of emotions and neuroscience suggest 
that something like “intuition” is at the very core of human reasoning 
and that our actions are based on and motivated by rational emotions—
for Confucius, the very emotions cultivated through observing ritual 
propriety.
ii. emotional DeveloPment
Given the paucity of textual evidence, it is difficult to reconstruct 
Confucius’s conception of emotional development. The most promising 
account can be found in Analects 15:18: “exemplary persons have a sense 
of appropriateness (yi ) at their basic disposition (zhi ), develop 
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it through observing ritual propriety (li ), express it with modesty, 
and consummate it by making good on their word (xin ).” elsewhere 
(Analects 6:18), Confucius notes the need to refine or socialize one’s 
disposition through culture—being careful, though, not to overwhelm 
it. one cannot help but conclude that Confucius felt our basic emotions 
to be partly trustworthy, needing only refinement and exposure to other 
humans.
 ronald de Sousa’s account of emotional development may help com-
plete this picture. According to de Sousa in The Rationality of Emotion, 
the basic affect-response programs and primitive instinctual responses 
of infants are all too raw and amorphous to count as emotions (182).12 
Instead, humans first acquire emotions in concrete episodes or “paradigm 
scenarios” experienced in early childhood: “The quality of every emo-
tion is rooted in a dramatic, situation or episode type, associated with a 
characteristic feel . . . and characteristically also with components that 
can be identified as target, motivating aspect, and motivational aim.”13 
Thus, an essential part of emotional education consists in being attentive 
to natural or “genetically programmed” reactions in the child and nam-
ing these reactions within the context of the concurrent scenario, thus 
teaching the child that it is experiencing a particular emotion (de Sousa, 
Rationality of Emotion, 183). In these scenarios, we likely learn not only 
our roles but those of the other participants as well. Because of this, the 
normative enters irreducibly into the very fabric of the psychological at 
this constituent phase of our emotional education, as our responses can 
be subject to correction or disapproval (de Sousa, “emotions, education 
and Time,” 440).
 emotions are thus forged when instinctual or biological responses are 
fit into social “stories,” which ultimately define the meanings of the emo-
tions themselves. At this point, we may be tempted to equate paradigm 
scenarios with Confucius’s li, but that would not be quite right. for de 
Sousa, the emotions forged in these early paradigms affect the nature of 
later episodes; they are not the end product of one’s emotional education, 
but rather its foundation. They afford us with some prototype emotions 
keyed to certain social situations or configurations. These foundational 
emotions are similar to what Confucius referred to as one’s zhi ( )—basic 
substance or disposition. However, since these emotions come first, they 
enjoy ontogenetic privilege and will necessarily affect the way we react 
to future situations. At times previously learned reactions will align 
with future situations; at times, they will not. Superficial similarities in 
context can elicit emotional reactions that may be inapt. only through 
further experience and education can one’s emotional prompts hope to 
be fine-tuned so as to transcend their prototypes and align correctly 
with the immediate social context. As de Sousa puts it, “[T]he principal 
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achievement of emotional life is one which paradigm scenarios make 
possible, at the same time as they constitute an obstacle to its full real-
ization. It is an ability to transcend emotional repetition, and achieve 
genuine emotional connection with the present” (“emotions, education 
and Time,” 445). Confucius might paraphrase along these lines: “The prin-
cipal achievement of a virtuous life is one which our original dispositions 
(zhi ) make possible, at the same time as they constitute an obstacle 
to its full realization. It is only by refining (wen ) these dispositions 
through participating in social rituals (li ) that emotions enable one 
to connect appropriately (yi ) with the present.”
iii. intelligent emotions anD reasoneD intuitions
Already implicit in Confucius’s account is that our nascent dispositions 
have access to values and that one’s education serves primarily to guide 
and refine them. Indeed, several philosophers now employ the basic 
hypothesis that emotions are modes of perception, presenting the world 
to us as value-laden.14 Accordingly, our emotions are not indiscriminate 
responses to random external triggers but instead perceive relatively 
objective values (relative insofar as they are meaningful only to humans 
and human life). emotions are thus sensitive to axiological information 
and, as with other modes of perception, are “passive.”15
 De Sousa believes emotions solve the “philosophers’ frame problem,” 
which may be characterized as follows: out of the potentially infinite 
number of facts that may be relevant to formulating our present ac-
tions, how are we to choose the relevant ones? How are we to remain 
undistracted by irrelevant facts? Practical reasoning is insufficient for 
the task, and de Sousa, as explained in The Rationality of Emotion, 
believes emotions fill the gap; they perceive values and control their 
salience, channelling attention to what features of the situation are 
most important. Moreover, the “narrative” aspect of emotions highlighted 
by de Sousa suggests how emotions are also connected with certain 
paradigmatic outcomes. When emotions draw attention to values in the 
situation at hand, these values are not divorced from a narrative context. 
Certain outcomes are already prefigured at the moment of detection, 
an insight common to many thinkers in early China. “The Chinese as-
sumption is that action starts from spontaneous motives and that before 
asking ‘What shall I do?’ I am already being drawn in one direction or 
another.”16
 We find a similar account in Antonio Damasio’s persuasive somatic-
marker hypothesis in Descartes’ Error. According to Damasio, as the 
reasoning process begins the mind is “replete with a diverse repertoire 
of images, generated to the tune of the situation you are facing, entering 
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and exiting your consciousness in a show too rich for you to encompass 
fully” (169). each of these images (we might say “latent responses”) 
will, as a result of learning and experience, be marked with a certain 
qualitative feel or emotional valence (for example, “that might be good,” 
“this might be bad,” etc.); negative outcomes are discarded, while posi-
tive outcomes are pursued. Hence, these emotional markers work as a 
kind of “biasing device,” effectively limiting the possible outcomes we 
need consider or reason through. “There is still room for using a cost/
benefit analysis and proper deductive competence, but only after the 
automated step drastically reduces the number of options. . . . Somatic 
markers probably increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision 
process. Their absence reduces them” (Damasio, ibid., 173).
 We now have plausible reason to believe Confucius’s claim to ef-
fortless, spontaneous, and appropriate response. using Damasio’s 
terminology, Confucius’s program of incessant self-cultivation will pro-
duce countless somatic-markers, extending the range of stimuli that 
become automatically marked. The accrual of these markers over time 
fine-tunes and accelerates the decision-making process; at the limit, 
the correct course of action would come to mind immediately, with 
compelling emotional valence. In completely novel situations, we may 
be at a loss for an appropriate response, leaving us immobile. Similarly, 
where social configurations trigger overlapping schemes associated with 
multiple markers, we may be perplexed and unsure how to react. This 
can occur, for example, in situations where we find individuals playing 
roles we are not accustomed to seeing them play or when we encounter 
individuals acting according to situational norms that conflict with our 
own. However, familiarity with a broad range of emotions, facilitated 
through exposure to literature, art, and social rituals, will allow one 
to perceive values in a wide range of scenarios, thus improving the 
likelihood of responding appropriately in any particular situation. An 
expansive emotional repertoire steers us away from stereotypical (we 
might say “ritual”) responses and allows us to respond to the particulars 
of the present situation (as opposed to the particulars of a merely similar 
situation we have encountered in the past).
 This again highlights the limits of propriety, which both enables and 
imperils the exercise of virtue. Without participating in social rituals 
and conventions, a human being cannot even begin to learn virtuous 
conduct, yet the “ritualistic” aspect of propriety can desensitize or blind 
the virtuous agent to the need for particularized response.
Honing Perspicacity
Limiting ourselves to our own experiences—however broad—may tend 
toward subjectivity. yet we can improve the accuracy of our emotional 
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responses through a method of reflective equilibrium: evaluating our 
emotional responses in light of other perspectives or other emotions. 
“To judge the validity of ordinary sense-perception, we bring to bear 
background knowledge, reason, logic, and corroborating or conflicting 
perceptions. We do the same in coming to judge of the validity of any 
particular emotion.”17 for example, we frequently talk about what is 
and is not funny, shameful, enviable, or disgusting. This shows that it 
matters to us whether our feelings or emotions are accurately track-
ing those properties or values of which they purport to be perceptions 
(D’arms and Jacobson, “Moralistic fallacy,” 69). When we hear of 
another’s jealousy, for example, we most likely want to know what is 
causing the jealousy and judge its appropriateness ourselves. Instead 
of discussing morals (“it’s wrong to be jealous”), we discuss fit (“is there 
a reason to be jealous?”).
 I agree with Justin D’arms and Daniel Jacobson that discourse on the 
fittingness of an emotion can sometimes be more effective in regulating 
our emotional responses than other kinds of discourse, such as moral 
or prudential (“Moralistic fallacy,” 73). for example, rather than ask 
whether it is prudent or morally suspect to feel jealous of a successful 
colleague, we often discuss whether there is anything to be jealous of, 
whether the occurrence (or the intensity) of the emotion fits the particu-
lars of the situation—in this case, the relative success of the colleague 
and what sort of relationship exists between the persons involved. In-
deed, if emotions were not open to this kind of objective evaluation, we 
would lose the ability to have these sorts of discussions, which constitute 
an enormous part of our social lives.
 reading the Analects, one is struck by the prevalence of this practice 
of noting the particulars of the situation under moral evaluation and 
the relationships of the individuals involved. evaluating the actions of 
historical figures and contemporary personages—often to determine 
whether they were appropriate or exemplified virtue—was an import-
ant pedagogical tool for Confucius: “Carving, polishing, cutting, grinding 
(1:15)”—emotions are shaped through dialogue and reflection. Isolated 
from others’ perspectives, emotional education is handicapped; it is 
through juxtaposition that we inform and enhance the reflective process, 
sharpening intuitive faculties.
iv. minD reaDing
Many will perhaps grant that intuitions, as outlined above, are reliable 
in familiar or ordinary circumstances. We are, after all, at an epistemic 
advantage when exacting highly particularized responses toward those 
we know well since we are conversant with their individual histories and 
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sensitive to their moods. on the other hand, much of our interactions 
involve persons whose histories and idiosyncrasies are relatively (if not 
completely) unknown. How reliable will our intuitions be in unusual 
situations? even with an expansive emotional repertoire cultivated 
from diverse sources, our emotional stories may not “match” those of 
strangers.
 This is a considerable objection. Indeed, Confucius seems implicitly 
aware of it, for throughout the Analects we find him hinting at a pos-
sible solution: mind reading. As noted at the outset, propriety requires 
emotional “presence” to be considered virtuous. This suggests that our 
emotions are, to a large extent, transparent. As D’arms and Jacobson 
observe, “[I]n normal human psychology . . . the relationship between 
feeling an emotion and expressing it—especially in involuntary behavior 
such as blushing, cringing, or crying—is exceedingly tight. Moreover, 
others are notoriously perceptive at sensing when we are inwardly 
amused by their plight or attempting to conceal our anger” (“Moralistic 
fallacy,” 77–78). Nicholas Humphrey describes the relationship as one 
of “contingent correlation.”18
 In several passages, Confucius directs attention to this transpar-
ency of emotions (1:3, 5:5, 5:10, 5:25, 6:16, and 8:4), and commands his 
disciples to remain attentive to axiological clues (2:10, 7:28, 9:24, 11:21, 
and 12:20). Hence, those who seek appropriateness (yi) “examine what 
is said, are keen observers of demeanor and are thoughtful in deferring 
to others” (12:20). By “mind reading,” then, I mean nothing more than 
what we engage in everyday—inferring motives, meanings, and inten-
tions from words, gestures, and expressions.19 Virtuous conduct requires 
constant fine-tuning, and mind reading is indispensable in fine-tuning 
our interactions with others. Indeed, since ritual is itself a vehicle for 
expressing emotion, a sensitive practitioner of ritual will be effective 
at inferring the inner states of other advanced practitioners. reading 
minds, in this sense, is a substantial (though overlooked) theme of the 
text.20
 There is a direct relationship between education and mind reading 
on one hand and cultivated intuitions on the other. Neither inborn nor 
the prerogative of an elite substratum of society, intuition results from 
practice—which is open to anyone; indeed, it is difficult to see how one 
could have any intuitions in the absence of education and socialization. 
Hence, those concerned with virtue risk deleterious consequences if 
isolated from others. In the apt words of Joel Kupperman, “[W]e take for 
granted the phenomenon of the literarily accomplished man who is ex-
ceedingly childish. In traditional China, such a man would be considered 
to represent a failure of education” (“Confucius and the Problem of Nat-
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uralness,” 181).21 Thus, above and beyond study and reflection—both of 
which can be done in isolation—Confucius emphasized practice (that is, 
observing social rituals) and attentiveness (that is, mind reading). The 
resulting spontaneity is not anomalous but rather highly intelligent 
and sensitive.22
v. social magic
Before concluding, we should note that Confucius believed this intuitive 
ability to have benefits beyond the locus of the individual; skilled virtu-
ous exemplars will also benefit the world by “just being themselves,” as 
it were. Minimally, this means that we can expect virtuous exemplars 
to be generous, just, and helpful. However, Confucius obviously believes 
they effect harmony through more than concrete acts of virtue. over and 
above these, they will possess a type of “excellence” or “potency” (de ) 
to which others acquiesce. This is suggested in a number of passages in 
the Analects, for example,
The excellence of an exemplary person is like wind, the excellence of 
a petty person like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass, and it is 
sure to bend (12:19).
If for a single day one can overcome oneself and observe ritual propri-
ety, the whole empire would defer to his humanity (ren ) (12:1).
The Master wanted to settle among the nine barbarian tribes of the 
eastern yi. Someone said, “But could you put up with their crude 
ways?” The Master replied, “once an exemplary person settles among 
them, what crudeness could there be?” (9:14)23
How can we account for these “magical” effects in terms of the axiological 
model described above? The most plausible answer is this: virtuous 
exemplars, finely attuned to the axiological level of reality and attentive 
to subtlety and nuance in human interaction, will respond comprehen-
sively to the relatively objective values at play in most social situations. 
Whereas inexperienced and insensitive individuals will be confounded 
when facing an ethical dilemma, virtuous exemplars will simply “read” 
the situation and respond readily and authoritatively. Hence, their 
abilities will seem magical to onlookers. further still, their intuitions 
will be supported by widespread recognition—others will “bend” to their 
charisma—and their very existence thereby reduces friction and effects 
harmony. As A. C. Graham has noted, “The ritual act, influencing through 
interrelations which the agents do not analyse, does have an efficacy 
different in kind from the act calculated as means to an end. The man 
of Potency [de] who has, not an abstract knowledge of conventions, but 
an effortless skill and grace in operating with them, although ‘doing 
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nothing,’ does enhance the order around him” (Disputers of the Tao, 25).24 
Here, pace Herbert fingarette, the magic is not in the ritual act itself but 
in the intuitive ability of the virtuous exemplar to apply rituals consist-
ently to their appropriate settings.25 for example, not every handshake 
is reciprocated, nor every request for assistance fulfilled, and though 
children are taught early on to use the magic word “please” to get what 
they want, they are doomed to disappointment. The efficacy of a ritual 
lies in its proper application.
 It may be helpful to compare “ideal axiological agents” (whose 
responses are always spontaneous and fitting) with consummate comed-
ians (whose jokes always get a laugh). A comedian uses scripted jokes 
as well as direct improvisation; yet without a keen sense of timing and 
the ability to read and respond to the ebb and flow of the audience’s 
reactions, a comedian’s jokes will not produce laughter. They will lack 
the requisite spontaneity and authenticity. The ability to know when to 
stick to the “routine” and when to improvise is what distinguishes skilled 
comedians from hacks. Likewise, a virtuous agent will observe conven-
tional propriety until she senses the need to depart from the “script” 
and respond to the particulars of the situation at hand. Sticking to the 
routine will not do for great comedians, and sticking to “conventional 
propriety” will not do for Confucius’s virtuous agent.
 Notwithstanding the popular expression, “everyone” is not a comed-
ian. Some people seem to be funny “by nature,” just as some people seem 
naturally virtuous. Nevertheless, everyone possesses a sense of humor, 
just as everyone possesses a sense of virtue. The important thing is to 
cultivate them.
vi. conclusion
Can self-cultivation and mind-reading lead to error-free virtue? Confu-
cius’s standard is impossibly high, and it is safe to say that the “ideal 
axiological agent” (or Confucius at seventy) remains a myth of ethical 
theory. Social values are in constant flux, and our “emotional idiolects” 
will have to adapt to an ever-changing axiological landscape.26 Memory 
loss or inattentiveness will greatly affect our intuitive abilities, and 
tragic episodes or luring vices could unhinge or undo the best of us; even 
a poor diet can disrupt cognitive processes. Hence, no matter how persis-
tently we study, how deeply we reflect, or how extensively we practice, 
we must always maintain an ironic stance toward our own emotional 
responses (de Sousa, “Moral emotions”). emotions reveal values in many 
situations, and we can improve our emotional responses overall. emo-
tions cannot, however, be made immune to error; as with other modes of 
perception, they are fallible. Indeed, with success, the virtuous agent is 
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liable to fall victim to ego or vanity or other, more benign, instances of 
emotional projection.27 Hence, Confucius promoted flexibility, deference, 
and awareness of one’s ignorance (for example, 9:4). Wholly trusting 
one’s emotions requires sustained, prolonged, incessant practice. After 
all, it had taken “the Sage” himself over half a century. Ironic, indeed. 
Still, if we find it reasonable to rely on our vision even while occasion-
ally falling victim to illusion, then we should not abandon emotions as 
guides to value, even if they prove fallible.
 Confucius’s greatest anxieties arose from his observation that social 
rituals—the most critical method of cultivating emotions—were on 
the decline, performed rarely and with neither the correct form nor 
the appropriate spirit. This perennial lament can be found in almost 
any society. yet if we are to take the role of emotions seriously in the 
conduct of life and if we accept that rituals are pivotal to shaping emo-
tions, then we might wonder, along with Confucius, how likely it is to 
effect social harmony in their absence.28 To many, the ritual minutiae 
that comprise most of book 10 of the Analects will seem quaint at best, 
priggish at worst. Many of the things that Confucius saw as ethically 
significant tend to be viewed by modern people as matters of taste or 
style (Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation). This is true, but there 
is more at stake here than taste. for if the richness of our emotions is—
at least in part—a reflection of the richness of the rituals we engage 
in, maybe he was not such a prig after all. Maybe Confucius was really 
on to something: that the magical realm of human intercourse is stead-
ily eroded when we fail to observe our rituals. We hardly notice it, but 
oftentimes a kind smile from a friend, a playful wink from a stranger, 
or a meaningful handshake from a supportive colleague can completely 
change our attitudes. rituals connect us emotionally, and impoverished 
emotional repertoires can only hinder social contact and bleed our worlds 
of meaning.29
 The ideal of emotional perfection, that effortless and unself-conscious 
action of Confucius at seventy, may seem daunting, even hopeless.30 
Notwithstanding the neat biography sketched at the outset, Confucius 
would largely concur: “even with a man who urges himself on in his 
studies as though he was losing ground, my fear is that he may not 
make it in time” (8:14).31 Such reservations can be found throughout the 
Analects.32 yet the ideal should not be abandoned, if only to serve as a 
telos, a waypoint to prod the weary disciple and vindicate the excruciat-
ing demands of virtue. After all, fifty-five years of self-cultivation is no 
sinecure.33
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China (New york: oxford university Press, 2003).
4. Compare de Sousa (322): “one natural requirement to place on an 
emotion’s origins is that it should not merely be a ritual. for authentic emo-
tion, almost by definition, is an individual response. It may be partly socially 
determined, but it must be spontaneous in the way that a ritual is not. yet 
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IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 2; subsequent references to this work 
will be cited in the text.
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